Some who believe that moral values are not absolute (e.g., Joyce, 2001) nevertheless think we might be better retaining the fiction of moral absolutes and continue to speak of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’…that such talk would better reinforce the shared values a community has, providing a net benefit. Whether this is the case is, as Joyce and others have observed, an empirical question, but one might hope that people could see values for what they are and learn to better understand and reason about differences in them while still respecting their importance.

(One exception to eliminating the language of moral realism (i.e., that there are objective moral truths) might be for raising children, where a simpler approach may be needed to encourage particular behaviors. Greene (2002) observes that we might “simply allow or even encourage realist dialogue with those who are too young to handle the meta-ethical truth [that there are no moral absolutes]”(p. 279).)

However, this does not mean that understanding such differences is of no use at all. It’s possible to consider stereotypes as primarily empirical claims about the average characteristics of a group. The negative connotation of stereotyping applies mostly to situations where the claims are false or erroneously assumed to apply to all individuals in the group and/or are used in place of (and sometimes despite even knowing) the actual characteristics of the individual. It may also be a problem when stereotyped differences are wrongly assumed to be unchangeable (which is more often attributed to stereotypes believed to be biological in origin). But an accurate stereotype may provide at least some information when more specific or useful information is not available or possible. Forced to choose randomly from a group of men or women for a task requiring great strength one would be better off choosing from the group of men.

A much harder question is to what extent a true stereotype — of people in general and in all cultures (i.e., a so-called fact or at least statistical claim about mostly biologically determined human nature) or of men or women in particular — should be used in combination with other available information. Even if the individual in question is oneself or someone else known first-hand there is often insufficient information for making important judgments. If a stereotype is valid and of sufficient magnitude it could be reasonable to consider it as a clue or best guess about the existence or strength of an uncertain characteristic or behavior, though giving it its proper due (and no more) may be difficult. In reality there are few stereotypes of usefulness that are certain or of clearly known strength compared to individual factors we may know directly…the greater parenting drive or capability of women? the greater promiscuity of men? And any such established statistical difference, can, again, make no automatic claim to be being unchangeable (whether mostly biological or cultural), productive of our happiness or of intrinsic value. But it may sometimes be reasonable to assess the evidence for and strength of these purported average differences and see what if any role they might play in the decisions we make.

Individual variability and external reinforcement play a significant role in what’s possible. Most people can learn to control urges for revenge. Some choose celibacy without apparent cost (how many?), while for many monogamy is difficult to sustain or not really embraced in the first place, or exists for a period of time in a state of tension. Pinker (1997) casts doubt on the 1960’s ambitions of free love and an egalitarian society, arguing persuasively for the widespread existence, likely evolutionary origins and great difficulty in overcoming sexual jealousy and competition. Modern day capitalism has lately run rampant over any alternative economic model in its appeal to a view of human nature based on universal and mostly unmodifiable self-interest and competition. But just how desirable (or undesirable) and unchangeable are which tendencies?